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This paper explores de case of the Pampanga nation, living near Manila, which
proved especially helpful and cooperative with the Spanish colonial armies in the
Philippines. Although Pampangos were praised for their bellicosity, we think that this is not
so much due to their being a martial race, but rather that they entered into a process of mi -
litary assimilation with the Spaniards that benefited both parties, receiving more training,
compensation and satisfaction than other Filipino nations.
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Este trabajo explora el caso particular de la nación Pampanga, situada cerca de
Manila, y que resultó de gran ayuda en la expansión colonial española en las Filipinas.
Aunque los pampangos eran ensalzados por su belicosidad, pernsamos que ello se debe no
a petenecer a un tipo de «racia marcial», sino a un proceso de asimilación progresiva den-
tro de los ejércitos españoles que gue util para ambas partes; bien porque recibieran ma -
yor preparación militar, compensación y satisfacción que otras naciones filipinas.
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Oftentimes historians working on Spanish America neglect the Asian
territory of the Philippines that in fact belonged to the same administrative
realm. Colonially speaking, this archipelago was an extension of the
Viceroyalty of Mexico, thus their history was very much intertwined. Both
regions were very similar in administrative aspects, enjoying the same
institutions, like the Audiencia, the system of encomiendas, etc. This rela-
tion and similarity was possible thanks to the yearly long trip of Acapulco
galleons bound for Manila, departing in the spring and returning in summer
through a five month trip.
Considering that the study of the peripheral colonial areas usually
offers a different angle that helps to better understand the central ones.
First, we would like to focus in this article on the recruitment of native war-
riors in the Philippines, a kind of administrative action whose procedure
varied throughout the empire, nevertheless enjoyed great similarities.
Second, we will see a particular case of this military life in the fortress of
San Salvador in Isla Hermosa (Taiwan).
Most of the studies on the Spanish armies in the Americas focus espe-
cially on the 18th century, on the verge of colonial independence.1 On the
contrary, studies on how they were formed and how they enrolled natives
in the 16th and early 17th centuries were fewer until the recent publication of
Indian Conquistadors (2007)2 that offered a new angle to the Spanish mi -
litary strategies and a deep knowledge of the military role played by
American natives in Spanish armies. This is a very important matter to cla -
rify because, as Patricia Seed had mentioned, for the Spaniards «arriving at
first in relatively small groups [and] not massive armies, skilled in acqui -
ring alliances with natives or in deploying traditional hatreds for their own
ends proved critical»,3 and additionally might be helpful to understand
later developments in the colonies.
The American and Far East background
When we look for details about enrollment of soldiers in Spanish
America we find a trend throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, which is the
increasing number of Creole soldiers and the decrease of the Spanish;4 but
1 Marchena Fernández & Gómez Pérez, 1992; Togores Sánchez, II, 2006, 477-494.
2 Matthew & Oudijk (eds.), 2007.
3 Seed, 2005, 139.
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little information is given about natives serving with Spanish troops in the
early decades, of which they should have been large numbers. And this
should be true in Mexico as well as in the Philippines. The lack of speci fic
information leads to what Matthew Restall called the «invisible warriors»,
claiming that «The search for native allies was one of the standard proce-
dures or routines of Spanish conquest activity throughout the Americas».5
In a fast overview we can recall that at the beginning of the conquest of
Mexico Hernán Cortés made alliances with local tribes, like the Totonacs,
the Campoallans, the Tlaxcalans, to fight with the Aztecs. After the con-
quest of Mexico he sent Pedro de Alvarado to invade Guatemala with 420
soldiers and 6,000 Cholula and Tlaxcala auxiliaries. These Tlaxcalans war-
riors were the best known because «for theirs was the first major polity to
ally with Cortes in significant numbers».6 In the case of Peru, when
Francisco Pizarro was in command of the territory, he used local warriors
for further expeditions. For example, Almagro in his unsuccessful explo-
ration of Chile was with 150 Spaniards, accompanied by near 10,000 yana-
conas (servants of the Incas, or native auxiliaries of the Spaniards in Peru,
that in Mexico were called naborías) to transport the weapons, clothing,
and food. In the another expedition to Chile to fight the Araucans in 1539,
Pedro de Valdivia went with 150 Spaniards and 3,000 yanaconas. Even in
the Chilean war the Spanish adopted some native warfare methods.7
Another example can be the one of the most ruthless conquistadors,
Gonzalo Pizarro, who left Quito in March 1541 for an expedition across the
Andes, with 220 soldiers and 4000 native servants. But the natives were
not only enlisted for direct conquest but also to fight insurgents, as is well
documented in the case of New Granada that we know thanks to the book
of Vargas Machuca published in Madrid in 1599, which we can consider as
a kind of manual of guerrilla warfare.8
But more appealing than estimating the number of soldiers, is to know
the conditions of the enrollment of these native soldiers, whether as ser-
vants or allies, in order to know how this might affect future relations. In
the Philippines is easier to make these considerations because it is a small-
er territory compared to the Americas. It seems that in this oriental colony
4 See Marchena Fernández & Gómez Pérez, 1985, 127-215.
5 Restall, 2003, 44.
6 Schroeder, 2007, 14.
7 Parker, 1988, 120.
8 Vargas Machuca, 2008.
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some differences can be seen, first because the arrival of Legazpi in the
archipelago was much later (1565), and second because the discussions on
the just war and the Law of Nations were over, and the ideas of Vitoria on
Indian rights were already predominant, consequently the relations with the
Indians was not going to be the same as in the Americas. Additionally, the
Philippine archipelago was not isolated, it enjoyed long relations with
Chinese, with other Southeast Asian realms and even with the Muslims that
arrived to the area a little earlier than the Spaniards.9 Other reasons that
may explain the difference between Mexico and Manila might be that the
Spaniard soldiers in America, while scarce, were proportionally more
numerous than the few Spaniards living in the Philippines, or better to say
in Manila, where they concentrated. Yet, the similarities still outweigh the
differences.
Another important factor to consider is the Dutch rivalry with Spain.
As is well-known, since the beginning of the 16th century both countries
shared the same monarch but a half century later Holland initiated a process
of independence that derived in a long war. This war had three different
fronts, Europe, America (particularly Brazil) and the Pacific Ocean, from
the Spice Islands (presently in Eastern Indonesia) to Japan. The Dutch
showed up for the first time in the East in 1599 and later in 1601, 1603 and
1604 tried to take over the Portuguese colony of Macao. In 1602 they found-
ed the powerful Commercial Company of the East Indies (VOC), a self-gov-
erning body with military might, and in 1605 they conquered the
Portuguese settlement of Ambon. No wonder, the Spanish governor in The
Philippines Pedro Bravo de Acuña wrote in 1605 to the king: «I think that to
drive the [Dutch] enemy from the Moluccas and from the islands of Banda,
will be of great advantage to our affairs in Flanders, since the rebels of
Holland and Zeeland harvest the products of these islands, and draw to them
great wealth, by means of which they carry on war and become rich».10
9 An analysis of the types of political organization prevalent among the natives of Southeast
Asia may throw light on the interaction of Spaniards with the Pampangos. Shinzo Hayase in his analy-
sis of the maritime Southeast Asian world regarding the aspect of «kingdom/nation-making» defines
four types: (1) the kingdoms formed by Indianization, (2) the kingdoms formed by Islamization and the
influence of the «age of commerce», (3) the colonial states formed by Christianization, and (4) the
chiefdoms which did not form a kingdom (see Hayase, 2007, 16-17). We think that the Pampangos were
a mixture of everything, since they counted initially with a clear political organization, and at the same
time they were affected by Christianization, and finally kept their own social model under a theoretical
Spanish vassalage. 
10 Schurz, 1989, 283.
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This rivalry, which lasted for half a century, ranged from small skir-
mishes to major battles, first in the Moluccas, later in the Philippines, and
even in farther places like Taiwan. Earlier, in 1616, in the Moluccas,
Manila Governor General Juan de Silva launched an attempt to give Dutch
power a deathblow, but it was a failure and the Dutch continued extending
their power. Ten years later, Spanish troops were deployed to Taiwan
(1626), to overthrow the Dutch, to protect the China-Manila trade from
Dutch interference and to assure a safe and easy passage to China and
Japan. The two powers occupied two different areas in Taiwan until 1642,
when the Dutch finally ousted the Spaniards from the island11 Consequently
we are going to present a particular case of enrollment in Spanish colonial
armies, the one of the Pampangos in the Philippines and particularly in
Taiwan, as an Eastern model that may serve to establish comparisons with
Spanish armies in America as well with Dutch armies in the East.
The progressive presence of Pampango soldiers in Spanish armies
Filipino soldiers were a key factor in Spanish armies because they
usually outnumbered the Spanish soldiers. Here we will look into this mat-
ter in two ways. First, the reasons behind the progressive enlistment of
Filipino soldiers —especially the Pampangos (and also the Cagayanos for
the case of Taiwan)—, not only in the conquest of Luzon at the end of the
16th century, but especially during the Dutch War Period (1600-1648).
Second, we will look into the particular case of Filipino soldiers in Taiwan
(i.e., their enlistment, length of service, salaries, names, etc.), to see if this
particular case of native soldiers fighting outside their land, can help us bet-
ter understand the readiness of the Pampangos and the Cagayanos to join
the Spanish armed forces.
It is impossible to accurately quantify the number of Filipino and
Spanish soldiers involved in military activities, but we have tried to make
some estimation from the classical historical sources not only in the period
of the first settlement (1575-1600) but also during the Dutch Wars (1600-
1648). But, to contextualize the enrolment of the Filipino soldiers during
the years of the Spanish presence in Taiwan (1626-1642), let us see first the
following table:
11 Borao, 2009, 7-30.
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TABLE 1
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SPANISH AND FILIPINO SOLDIERS
IN THE EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS
12 Blair & Robertson, 1905.
13 Francisco Navas del Valle; Pablo Pastells. Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas
Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla. Precedido de una Historia General de Filipinas,
(Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 8 vols.: 1928-1935).
14 Borao, 2001-2002 (later cited as SIT).
15 Malumbres, 1918; Molina, 1984; Morga, 1609; and Aduarte, 1963, [1640]
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From archival sources BRPI,12 NP,13 SIT14 and from secondary literature.15
Year Expedition Spaniards Filipinos Total Source
1575 Expedition against Limahong 250 2500 2750 Molina I, 78
(Pangasinan)
1578 First expedition to Borneo 400 1,800 2,200 BRPI XV, 54
1581 First expedition against Taysufu 100 No data Malumbres, 28-29
(Cagayan)
1581 Second expedition to Borneo No data No data
1582 First expedition to the Moluccas No data 1,500 BRPI XV, 57
1589 Second expedition to the Moluccas No data No data
1591 Second expedition to Cagayan-Tuy 80 1400 1480 BRPI XIV, 282
1591 Expedition against the Zambales 120 3,000 3,120 BRPI VIII, 214
1593 Third expedition to the Moluccas No data No data
1596 First expedition to Cambodia 130 some Aduarte I, 316
(Gallinato)
1598 Second expedition to Cambodia No data No data
(Dasmariñas)
1602 First expedition to Joló 200 200 400 Molina I, 102
1603 First repression of the Sangleys 220 2,500 2,720 BRPI XIV, 131
1606 Fourth expedition to the Moluccas 1423 1,672 3,095 Molina I, 104
1609 Ofensive to Caraga (De Silva) No data No data 1,000 NP VI, lxxx-lxxxv
1616 Expedition to Sincapora (De Silva) 2,000 2,500 5,000 NP VI, cccxxvi
1617 The battle of Playa Honda (Manila) 1,736 1,593 3,429 NP VI, cccxcvi
1626 Expedition to Taiwan (advance fleet) 100 200 300 SIT, 146-149
1626 Expedition to Taiwan (entire fleet) 500 1,200 1,700 SIT, 88-90
1627 Second expedition to Taiwan 731 280 1,011 SIT, 100-101
1636 Second expedition to Joló 300 3,000 3,300 NP IX, xxxiv
1637 First expedition against Cudarat 500 3,000 3,500 NP IX, xxxiv
(Mindanao)
1638 Second punitive expedition to 600 1,000 1,600 NP VIII-b, cxxxiii
Mindanao-Joló 
1639 Second repression of the Sangleys 200 4,000 4,200 NP IX, xxxvi
1644 Defense of Abucay against the Dutch No data 600 Fernández, 146
This table allows us to ascertain that over 30,000-40,000 Filipino sol-
diers were mobilized over a period of almost 65 years (1575-1640). If we
consider the most conservative number of 30,000, the table reveals the ratio
of Spanish soldiers to Filipinos was, in the 16th century, 1:5.
Early on in 17th century, when the Dutch stepped into the South East
Asian seas threatening Portuguese and Spanish, the ratio shifted, and the
number of Spaniards was sometimes almost equal to the number of
Filipinos. Finally, in the 1630s, the Filipinos again outnumbered the
Spaniards. At the same time we must say that under the label of Spaniards
we must place other nationals, especially people from Nueva España
(Mexico), but we lack information to establish a clear proportion.
Early recruitment of Pampango soldiers (16th century)
As we have discussed this topic in an earlier work,16 it is very noti -
ceable that the majority of the native Filipino soldiers come from the
Pampanga region, a well populated area near Manila. These warriors
enrolled in the Spanish armies along the fourth quarter of the 16th century
in four specific moments. First in the expedition against the well-known
Chinese pirate Limahong, in Pangasinan (1571) and the less-known
Japanese pirate Taifusu in the north coast of Luzon (1581), who, after being
defeated, fled to Formosa and Japan».17
The second moment of close cooperation with native armies was dur-
ing the civil Borneo’s wars, first in 157818 and second in 1581,19 and in the
Moluccas’ war. This second expedition was organized by the then-newly
installed Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa, who had brought with him from
Mexico a motley group of 600 Spanish soldiers and civilians, which in con-
text reminds the escalonamiento system of recruiting Spanish soldiers in
America.20 On the other hand the Moluccas’ expeditions, the one in 1589
16 Borao, 2008, 74-93.
17 Malumbres, 1918, 28-29.
18 Molina, 1984, I, 76.
19 Molina, 1984, I, 78.
20 Some scholars argue that at the beginning of the conquest the first method of recruitment in
America was the acarreo (individual muster, like Hernan Cortés), later the escalonamiento (staggered
groups, like Pedro de Heredia), followed by a mixed system (Francisco Pizarro). See Marchena
Fernández and Gómez Pérez, 1985, 127-215.
CONTEXTUALIZING THE PAMPANGOS (AND GAGAYANO) SOLDIERS
Anu. estud. am., 70, 2, julio-diciembre, 2013, 581-605. ISSN: 0210-5810. DOI: 10.3989/aeamer.2013.2.07 587
(under Santiago de Vera) and that of 1593 (under Gómez Pérez de
Dasmariñas), might have firmed up the Spanish government’s confidence
in the fidelity of the Pampangos, and some of their leaders were rewarded
in those years with royal lands and properties. We should also include now
the expedition sent to the kingdom of Cambodia, to assist king Paramaraja
in his wars against the kingdom of Siam, where Spaniards went there in
1596 and in 1598 assisted by Pampangos.21
The third important moment of this early military relation was during
the exploration of Cagayan-Tuy and the war against the Zambales in 1591.
Luis Pérez Dasmariñas was sent there «with 70 or 80 Spanish soldiers, and
many Indian chiefs of Pampanga, who were going with their arms and men
to serve with Don Luis, to explore the province now called Tuy. The chief
took more than one thousand four hundred Indian bearers.» (BRPI XIV,
282). That same year, Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas declared war
against the Zambales, a tribe that inhabited the mountainous area close
to Pampanga, and in which Pampango soldiers were recruited, motivated
to the occasion of revenge old unsettled disputed with their old time
 enemies.22
Finally, after the turn of the century the expedition against the Muslin
sultanate of Jolo happened in 1602, led by Gallinato, «who was sent with
400 men, half of them Filipinos».23 But most important was the subsequent
Pampango help suppressing the Sangley uprising in Manila (1603)24 with
1000 warriors (BRPI XIV, 128-132).
Recruitment during the expeditions against the Dutch
The expeditions against the Dutch that took place in the first half of
the 17th century —in the context of the so-called Dutch Wars (1600-
1648)— mark a new phase in the enlistment of Filipino soldiers in the
Spanish armed forces, characterized by a more professional military war-
21 Rodao, 1997, 9-26.
22 This phenomenon is quite similar to the one that Spaniards had encountered in America, for
example when preparing for the conquest of Maya territory, where «there was not hint of racial solida -
rity between Nahuas and Mayas […] not should any be expected. Spaniards lumped different native
groups together as Indians, but to the Mayas of Calkini, the Culhuas were as foreign as the Spaniards».
Restall, 2003, 50.
23 Molina, 1984, I, 102.
24 For details about this uprising see Borao, 1998, 22-39.
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fare, that they «have learned in the presidiums of Terrenate, Zamboanga,
Joló, Caraga and other parts».25 To counterattack the Dutch encroachment,
the Spaniards sent three offensives outside the archipelago against the
Dutch. The first one in 1606 (Moluccas) 26 —where 1,423 Spaniards and
960 Pampangos and Tagalogs were involved. The second one was in 1616
organized by Juan de Silva attempting to defeat the Dutch in Java, in col-
laboration with the Viceroy of Portugal in Goa. De Silva left Manila in
January 1616 with a powerful fleet manned by 2,000 Spaniards and 2,500
Filipinos and 500 Japanese.27 The third one was in 1626 to Isla Hermosa
(Taiwan) to protect Manila from the seasonal blockades that Dutch
galleons.28 In this third reaction of 1626 the Spaniards occupied Quelang, a
prominent bay in the north of Taiwan, where they started installing the
fortress ad «city» of San Salvador, something that we will consider more
lengthily later.
In the Far East the Spaniards hardly engaged in hostilities with the
Dutch during the 1630s, and they focused more on the problems of
Mindanao and Joló. The Governor Corcuera started by sending 300
Spaniards and 3,000 natives (NP IX, xxxiv) on a punitive mission against
the Muslim chiefs in Mindanao. Soon after, another mission in Joló (1637)
saw Corcuera transporting on 11 junks three military companies —one
made up of 150 Spaniards, the second, which consisted of 100 Spaniards,
under the command of Captain Lorenzo de Orella, and the third, which
enlisted 100 Pampangos (NP VIII-b, liii). When they reached Zamboanga,
they enlisted 100 Spaniards and 50 Pampangos more. Later, Juan Nicolás
arrived with 80 Spaniards and 20 Pampangos. A new mission to Joló took
place in 1638, consisting of 80 boats, had 600 Spaniards and 1,000 natives,
500 of whom were adventurers and galley slaves (NP VIII-b, cxxxiii). We
end this fast account about the participation of native soldiers in the
Spanish armed forces during the term of Governor Corcuera, ascertaining
that 4,000 native warriors were involved in quelling the Sangley uprising of
1639. Of these, Corcuera gave a ratio of 200 Spaniards to 1,000 Pampangos
and 3,000 Tagalogs (NP IX, xxxvi).
25 Gaspar de San Agustín, 1890, [1698], 571.
26 Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, 1891, [1609], 354-393.
27 See the whole affair in NP VI, cccxxvi and in BRPI XVII, 251-280.
28 For an account of the blockades to Manila and the Spanish counteroffensives, see Borao,
2005, 226-247.
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It should not come as a surprise that the Augustinian Medina mani-
fested in 1630 his wonder of still seeing males in Pampanga: «This place
had had a great drainage of soldiers, that I am impressed how there are still
males. Certainly the governors send soldiers [from Pampanga] to
Moluccas, Cebú, Otón and Cagayan, places that have fortresses kept by
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South East Asia as scenario of the Spanish armies during the Dutch Wars period.
Pampangos, who even work more than the same Spaniards, do not receive
salary, have scarce food and receive bad dealings».29
Pampangos within the fortresses
We have so far tracked the movements of some soldiers assigned to
specific missions, but another aspect to look into is to study every fortress
and the number of native soldiers enlisted to serve in each one. For the
moment, a thorough task of checking the five or six main garrisons in the
Philippines exceeds our possibilities. Nevertheless we can analyze the
memorial that the Procurator of the Philippine Islands in the court of
Madrid, Juan Grau de Monfalcón, presented to the King in 1637 descri bing
the situation of the island two years earlier (SIT, 232-234). It helps us to
visualize the presence of the Pampango soldiers who were assigned all
throughout the islands.
The infantry soldiers were divided into two groups. The first group
was involved in «land combat» (section 51); it was assigned to the Manila
encampment, which besides Fort Santiago in Intramuros, was extended to
the fortresses of Cebú, Otón, Cagayan, and Isla Hermosa [Taiwan].
According to Monfalcón’s report, these satellite fortresses of the
«Manila camp» had a company of 140 Pampango soldiers with their
respective officers. The second group was assigned to Moluccas (section 52
of the report), where seven Spanish companies (570 soldiers) and two
Pampango companies (200 soldiers) comprised the infantry of the «war of
Maluco».
At this point, it would be interesting to look at their supposedly
monthly wages to see the difference between Spanish and Filipino soldiers
(SIT, 336-342).
A captain should earn 24 pesos, a second lieutenant, 16 pesos, a ser-
geant, eight pesos, and a soldier, four pesos. It is possible that—at least in
theory—this was the salary also for native soldiers designated by the
Council of the Indies; however, the wages that each soldier actually received
in Isla Hermosa in 1641 were much lower: four reals per soldier and one
peso per officer. It seems that —excluding mismanagement— the said
wages were «stretched» to expand the number of soldiers in the fortresses.
29 Juan de Medina, 1893, [1630], 127.
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Besides the Pampangos and Cagayanos, we have to consider the entire
branch of the navy, officially called «the branch of the navy and of weapon-
ry services» that surely included native personnel.
The same memorial states that there were six galleys, two of which
were assigned to Manila, two to Isla Hermosa and two to Terrenate, and
that these were manned by 1,080 penal workers (180 per ship) who proba-
bly corresponded to half of the 2,200 natives working in the said branch.
It seems difficult to recruit these personnel in Manila, and the most
recurrent possibility was to do it along the way. For example, in one of his
reports (1632), the Dominican Esquivel recommended a solution to gather
more workers in the port of Bangui, such as artisans and blacksmiths, a port
which lies along the route to Isla Hermosa.
«[These men] are also needed to row the vessels. Some 30 of them have been recalled.
This year [of 1632], native blacksmiths, carbon makers, iron workers, box makers and
gastadores are urgently needed to replenish [the work force] in the galleys. They can
be recruited from the provinces of Bulacan, Pangasinan, Ilocos, and Cagayan. They
may assemble at the Bangui port, where they can board two sampans that ply the
route from there to Isla Hermosa, as the distance between the two points is very
short.» (SIT, 195)
The soldiers of Isla Hermosa (Taiwan)
It is difficult to reconstruct exactly the number of Filipinos who had
gone to Taiwan during the Spaniards’ occupation of the island (1626-1642)
because detailed statistics are not available and the dispersed reports some-
times are conflicting. Still, we are going to make an approximation in order
to have a glimpse of the vicissitudes in manning the garrisons that they
experienced during their 16- year stay in the island.
The initial deployment of soldiers in 1626 arriving in Taiwan aboard
the conquest fleet landed in two phases (SIT, 26-27). The first was an
advance party made up of two galleys and some junks that transported 100
Spaniards and 200 «blacks and Pampangos» in May. This advance party
was followed by the entire fleet of 500 Spaniards and some 1,100 to 1,200
Pampangos in September (SIT, 90). Dutch sources make indirect mention
of the size of the fleets; still some other indications in the Spanish sources
seem to confirm this. According to the Dutch sources, this fleet expe -
rienced huge problems during the voyage. The majority died; the rest
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 perished in the Spanish post in Taiwan. As the Spanish sources say, «they
were afflicted by the land».
A second important attempt of deployment of soldiers took place in
1627. The loss of the previous armada and the urgency to dislodge the
Dutch from their newly established post in Tayouan led Governor Niño de
Tavora to send a third fleet. We have more precise figures from this second
voyage: 731 soldiers comprised the Spanish infantry, while 280 made up
the Pampango infantry, plus other ones, totaling 2015 men. This second
fleet met the same ill fate as the former. It departed late and was assailed
by a typhoon. Only the patache Rosario reached its destination. On it were
60 Spanish and 25 Pampango infantrymen (SIT, 101). From then on, no
massive deployment of soldiers was ever again attempted.
The number of soldiers in the early expeditions of conquest of
Northern Taiwan was much higher than that which was sent later to defend
the post. The data for the deployment of troops can be represented in the
following table:
TABLE 2
MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE SPANISH FORTS OF ISLA HERMOSA
Soldiers 1626 1629 163130 1633 1637 1639 1640 1641 1642
Spaniards 100 320 100 100 60 88 55 86 113
Pampangos 200 70 30 20 100 41 22 32 62
Cagayanos 150 50 79 96 87 93
Source: SIT, 147 SIT, 439 SIT, 147 SIT, 211 SIT, 500 SIT, 314 SIT, 324 SIT, 336 SIT, 397
We can assume that each time a relief ship was sent (since 1632, the
regularity was twice a year) the troops experienced the arrival of incoming
reinforcements and the departure of men who had to go back to Manila
because they were discharged or sick or had other like reasons. Obviously,
soldiers were not expected to return to Manila soon, at least not during the
first few years after the conquest, which proved to be very hard. By 1632,
even if the situation must have been consolidated, the first official reports
of the first desertions by Filipino soldiers arose, as we will see later. In the
30 Dutch sources estimate for that year 250 Spanish soldiers and 350 Pampangos (SIT, 147), a
data that—compared with the general trend—is obviously an exaggeration.
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final years of the Spanish occupation of Northern Taiwan it was hard to
recruit new soldiers and these men were recruited despite their lack of qual-
ifications and even if they had no previous training.
Since the records come from indirect sources, sometimes they are
conflicting. This is the case of the Dutch report of 1633, based in the dec-
laration of some deserters, who declared that the Quelang camp housed 100
Spaniards and 20 Pampangos, as well as 80-90 slaves who worked on the
fortress construction. Seeing in perspective, these 20 Pampangos represent
a very small figure. Regarding the Cagayanos, a letter from Corcuera in
1635 mentions that a junk on its way to Manila bore an order to take in 50
native soldiers when it passed Cagayan (SIT, 229), but still, the Pampangos
formed the majority of native expeditionary troops who manned the
fortresses in the first half of the period. This trend was reversed in 1637,
when the Cagayanos increased in number. In a special council that was
convoked in Manila that year to study the possibility of dismantling the
fortresses in Isla Hermosa, Governor Corcuera already bemoaned the diffi-
culty of sending relief to those fortresses and yet commended the
Pampangos’ reliability in bearing the job:
«And as for the few Spaniards whom the Viceroys of Mexico send every year, many
die because of the bad climate in this land, and so the Governor is obliged and prac-
tically forced to raise up companies from among the people of Pampanga in order to
help Terrenate, Zamboanga, Caraga, Cebu, Oton, Nueva Segovia, the said Isla
Hermosa and, lastly, this city which has three companies of 300 men. The Spaniards
that remain, with all their illnesses, are so few that they cannot assume all the vacant
posts and attend to the tasks of numerous sentinels.» (SIT, 263)
As regards the trend of replacements and discharges during the
Spaniards’ last two years in Taiwan, we have two specific lists of soldiers.
One contains the names of those who were recalled on 24 May 1640, when
Governor Cristóbal Márquez went back, bringing with him 33 Spanish sol-
diers, 19 Pampangos, and seven Cagayanos (SIT, 314-315). Portillo, the new
governor of Taiwan, resented the move because «the Pampangos who got
sent back to Manila were needed in this fort [San Salvador]. And since this
government does not have them, it will be necessary that the crown pay for
the wages of the Sangley hired to do these jobs» (SIT, 318). On the  other
hand, the reason behind the Cagayanos’ return was clearer. Their leader,
Captain Angel Cabul, was an old timer with bad habits. He had forsaken his
duties to the company and was exerting bad influence on the seamen.
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Portillo, for his part, realized that Corcuera was neglecting him in Isla
Hermosa, having decided to focus all his resources on the wars in Joló. In
a letter dated March 1642, Portillo wrote to Corcuera to air his complaint
more plainly, pointing out that the latest reinforcements were of little or no
use to him:
«The men from Cagayan who were brought in by Sergeant Major Cristóbal Márquez
and those whom I myself brought are a useless lot who are only good at eating up the
rice. I did not send them because they are an extra burden. Moreover, these men are
not the ones who have proven their worth to Your Lordship, but rather those who
wanted to be sent from Cagayan—all aged, some of who are 80 years old.» (SIT, 373)
For reconstructing the evolution of the troops before the final battle
against the Dutch we have made some calculations to fill up the previous
table. In 1640, 24 «useless» Cagayanos arrived and Portillo included them
in his new status report (SIT, 324). If we subtract these from the number of
men who had left the island with Cristóbal Márquez, we can have a rela-
tive picture of the situation in that camp in 1639. We also have a more com-
plete list with names and family names of the soldiers who manned the
fortress in 1641. These figures also confirm what we had said about the
increasing number of Cagayan soldiers in Isla Hermosa. Several reasons
must be behind this change, first the fact that Pampango soldiers were too
much in demand, also the fact that in 1639 the Spaniards had to face a
 sangley uprising near Manila, and it was not wise to disperse the close
Pampagan allies. Finally, the fact that Cagayan —located in northern
Luzon, in the last stage before the long lap to Taiwan— started to be con-
sidered as new source of recruitment.
We must say that the figures of table 2 only speak about soldiers,
Spaniards, Pampangos and Cagayanos, averaging of 250 to 300. The
detailed Dutch accounts of the prisoners made in 1642 after the conquest,
presents a more exact composition of the population of San Salvador,
because it includes civilians. Besides the number of 268 soldiers they offer,
the data mention 42 women (most of them must have been local women
married with soldiers), 18 children, 32 slaves, 55 servants of soldiers and
2 priests with 29 servants, reaching a total population of 400 people.31
Other aspect to consider is the desertion of the soldiers that cannot be
repatriated in the regular movement of troops from Manila to San Salvador
depending on the two annual relief ships from Manila. Existing documents
31 Borao, 2009, 122-123.
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about these ships contain more data about cargo than about passengers.32
After three fleets sent in 1626 and 1627, that in fact did not reach their des-
tination, only relief ships, called socorro, were sent out twice a year. Most
of them accomplished their mission successfully carrying all the provi-
sions, few got sunk and only one complaint was registered, referring to the
relief ship that arrived in May 1631, which consisted of two junks carrying
a meager cargo.
We do not know if soldier reinforcements arrived on those first relief
ships. Still, it seems possible that some native soldiers (particularly
Pampangos) that had arrived earlier in Taiwan had not stayed long enough
serving in the island, as to think they were entitled to return to Philippines.
Probably, the paltry cargo of the said relief ship of 1631 might have trig-
gered the first documented desertion by six Filipino Pampango soldiers. At
the end of June 1631, a group of deserters took a small vessel in Tamsui
and fled south, either to the Philippines or to the Dutch camp (SIT, 147-
148). Whatever their real motives were, all six showed up at the Dutch fac-
tory in Tayouan on 30 June, where they gave themselves up and were inter-
rogated about the reasons for their desertion.
Two of these men, Domingo de Cavadta and Alonche de Toulacque
(their names are spelled this way in the Dutch transcription), before going to
Taiwan lived close to Manila, meaning that probably they were Tagalogs.
They declared that seven years earlier, they were recruited by the Spaniards
to embark on a voyage. They formed a crew of Pampangos and black men
who departed for Quelang on a fleet composed of a frigate, two galleys, and
nine junks. From the time they arrived in Quelang until they escaped, they
were employed as construction workers for the Spanish fortifications. They
added that for the past two years, «they received no pay for their labor, but
rather beatings and ill treatment.» The other four deserters who were with
Cavadta and Toulacque and others who had arrived two years earlier also
made their statements. The general picture was that the Spanish detachment
being described was composed of 100 Spaniards and 25-30 Pampangos
who were also employed as construction workers for the fortress.33
32 Borao, 2003, 307-336.
33 However, what is strange about these figures is that the other data that the Dutch gathered
earlier (SIT, 147) indicated that there were about 200-300 Spaniards and 300-400 Pampangos. This
information came from the son of Captain China, one of the merchant-pirates who serviced the Dutch,
who was forced to dock in Quelang because of a storm. He was detained by the Spaniards from early
February to mid-March 1631. Soon after, the pirate reached Tayouan and gave a report whose content,
we believe, is exaggerated.
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According to Esquivel the reason for the desertion was the work con-
ditions —the tasks given them, the way they were treated, and the sorry
state of their families— which were more like those of a slave. Esquivel
goes on to say that in 1632, a new group of 17 deserters was discovered and
that they, too, were ready to take a sampan and flee to the north of the
Philippines. Esquivel also writes of the real and desperate condition of
those soldiers and explains the reasons for it. Many of them were recruited
on false promises: they were told that they were to be away for just two
months. Others were forced to row in the galleys as punishment for their
crimes. However, even after they had completed their term, they were
retained as penal workers. Here is the complete Esquivel’s narrative:
«Moreover, the native men [from the Philippines] would be spared of vexation every
time they are taken from their families to serve as soldiers to guard another land and
who serve here as slaves since the time this place was occupied (now, seven years).
They abandon their children, wives and their lands, and the next time they see them,
many out of hunger would have sold themselves into slavery. These present condi-
tions have made them so desperate that two or three years ago, some went over to the
fort of the Dutch —five Cagayanos and a panday. Recently, it was ascertained that at
most 17 of them were reported to have escaped. Taking with them some firearms and
a Sangley sampan that would come to the port; they escaped in it to the Babuyan
Islands. In the same period, one was hanged for desertion. He had escaped to the
mountains of Quimaurri in uniform and with spear. I also have heard others cursing
so much, and it is not surprising that they complain. They live in despair and anger
because they are neither relieved from their posts nor sent back to their hometowns.
Some of them were deceived into thinking that they would be there only for two
months. Others came in galleys as to serve for their crimes but after their term is over,
they are kept there as construction workers because they do not send others from
Manila. In order to avoid these troubles at the least expense, what may be done is to
employ 100 or 200 Sangley laborers in both forts who can return to their lands, in the
place of these native workers.» (SIT, 171)
Taiwan’s Governor Palomino also recounts another desertion in 1638.
Three Cagayanos fled to the «enemy zone», which is probably the Tamchui
area. However, Palomino adds that they have begun to negotiate with them
so that they would return (SIT, 289). The reasons for this desertion are not
clear. In the same report that Palomino submitted to Corcuera, he declared
that that year’ natural conditions have been kind to them as regards the
deaths of soldiers. Only four had died: one Spanish soldier who was
already ill, a Pampango that Palomino brought with him in his voyage to
Isla Hermosa, and a boatswain and a Creole slave who were attacked by
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their native enemies on the road to Tamchui. Palomino further states in the
same report that he was sending back to Manila «20 soldiers, some of
whom are married, and the aide-de-camp Ginés de Rosas, who for this year
and as always, has fulfilled his duties very well. I also send some men from
Cagayan and four from Pampanga who are disabled» (SIT, 292). It is diffi-
cult to know if this was a general standard procedure for every relief ship
dispatched to Taiwan; or if the return of the soldiers was part of Corcuera’s
master plan implemented in 1637, to progressively dismantle the said
forces in Taiwan.
Other case of Cagayanos’ desertion was registered upon the conquest
of the Spanish fortress of Quelang by the Dutch. They made three groups
of captives. First, the Spaniards were to be sent to Batavia and from there
to be granted free passage either to Manila or to Spain. Secondly was the
group of 62 Pampangans who were to be kept with them in Batavia, and
eventually – if they proved loyal to the VOC interest– would join the
attacks on Manila. Finally, there were 93 soldiers from Cagayan, who were
also enslaved and most of them were put under the direct disposition of
Dutch commander Lamotius, who brought them to Tamchui (the Dutch
center of operations in northern Taiwan). When Lamotius left Tamchui and
headed towards the Tayouan (the Dutch factory in Taiwan), 6 Cagayan
slaves escaped, looking for shelter among the natives.34
This other case of desertion of Cagayanos magnified more the con-
trast that no Pampango desertions were registered in Taiwan, a situation
that also Gaspar of San Agustin stated for the case of Moluccas: «It must
be stated something strange: it is unknown that the Pampangas in the
Moluccas, even if they receive bad dealings [from the Spaniards], have
passed to the Dutch… on the contrary, among the other natives there are
many that have escaped».35
The battle of San Salvador (19-25 August 1642)
This final armed conflict between the Spanish and Dutch colonial
powers saw the defeat and the definitive withdrawal of the Spaniards from
34 The six Cagayanos reached the native Quimaurri, where were hidden with the knowledge,
consent or connivance of the chieftain. But in the end, due o the pressure of the Dutch, the
Quimaurrians had no choice but to surrender the Cagayanos to the Dutch.
35 Gaspar de San Agustín, 1890, [1698], 571.
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Isla Hermosa. The development of the battle was quite simple. Portillo,
Taiwan’s Spanish governor at that time, hardly put up a resistance. Thus
what could have been a month-long siege turned out to be a weeklong skir-
mish. The recruitment and involvement of native Filipinos in this battle fol-
lowed the same pattern, number, and ratio of Spaniards to Filipinos, as that
of previous military actions. In the initial resistance, Portillo deployed a
company of around 80 men, mostly Spaniards, and two groups of Cagaya -
nos and Pampangos, who marched under their own banner, showing that
they enjoyed certain «autonomy» within the army.
It is likewise interesting to see how the ratio of Spanish soldiers to
natives was maintained. When the said company retreated without an
engagement with Dutch forces, they left behind a small party of soldiers to
deal with the Dutch landing. This group again mirrored the previous ratio
of Spaniards to Cagayanos to Pampangos. When their number could no
longer hold up against the pressure of the Dutch, they retreated to the small
fortress La Mira, and soon later to La Retirada. There they joined the sol-
diers of Second Lieutenant Aréchaga, who where distributed again propor-
tionally. During five days they put resistance against the Dutch until they
could not hold that position anymore.
When Governor General Corcuera and his successor initiated an
investigation to find out who was indeed responsible for the fall of Isla
Hermosa, not one native was cross-examined. Only Spanish soldiers and
officers underwent cross-examination, probably because the Dutch kept the
Pampangos in Batavia with the intention of incorporating them to their own
army against the Spaniards. We may assume that this was not only because
of the Filipinos’ military skills, but also because these men were very
familiar with the land that the Dutch planned to conquer next. The Dutch
thought that using native collaborators would help conquer Manila more
quickly by exerting effective and unrelenting pressure on the city.
In relation with this we can cite the so-called tragedy of Abucay
(1647), that happened after the last attempt launched by the Dutch to con-
quer Cavite. After they failed, they retreated to Bataan, which is on the
opposite side of Manila Bay. They reached Abucay, the capital of Bataan,
which was under the protection of 600 Pampango soldiers under the com-
mand of Cabrera, the mayor of Pampanga. Cabrera had poor military
know-how. This was why instead of a commanding an open engagement
against the Dutch landing —which the Pampangos urged him to do— he
did not even try to fight but instead shut all the men up within the puny
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walls of a church. Cabrera was taken as hostage, and the rest of Pampangos
were shot in cold blood.36 When the Dutch could not collect any form of
ransom and were in turn beset by the Spanish troops from Manila, they left
the place. This coincided with the ending of hostilities between Spain and
Holland in 1648 with the signing of the Treaty of Munster.
Conclusion
We have mentioned five reasons by which Pampangos were progres-
sively involved in Spanish armies and becoming the native elite troops of
the Spaniards in the Philippines. These were: (1) the defence of their
 territory during the Limahong invasion; (2), the acquisition of an over-
seas experience and the receiving of cabalitas-encomiendas during the
Borneo and Moluccas wars; (3) the revenge and reward against close ene-
mies du ring the Zambales war; (4) the booty and honour during the
Sangley upri sing; (5) their professionalization of their military skills du -
ring the Dutch wars.
But now, after explaining the other kind of encomiendas they were
able to get in the 17th century, we can consider the last reason why the
Pampango aristocracy might have help in recruiting soldiers to fill up the
Spanish armies during the last years of the Dutch wars: (6) the expectation
of acquiring a formal encomienda, in the same category as the Spaniards,
help them to consolidate their status resembling somehow the Spanish
 aristocracy.
Precisely, among the known ten applications, the first ones —accor -
ding to Santiago— were submitted during these years of fighting the Dutch
by Pampangos: Don Ventura de Mendoza, who was half Tagalog (ca.
1620), Don Diego de Marácot (1623), Don Juan de Vera (1624) and Don
Nicolás de los Ángeles (1631).
We must say that the good relation between Spaniards and Pampangos
was probably based in a major hispanization —that we can observe, for
example, comparing the surnames of the Pampangos and Cagayanos sol-
diers’ lists (SIT, 339-342)— and in the fact that the Spaniards granted the
Pampangos greater independence by delegating power to the local Datus,37
36 Fernández, 1958, 146-147.
37 Larkin, 1972, 33.
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but this did not prevent that their allegiance to the colonial government was
entirely unconditional, since revolts happened,38 as well as with the
Cagayanos.39
Finally, shifting again our view from the Philippines to the Americas,
we perceive that there were more similarities than differences between both
regions in the recruitment of soldiers than expected. Probably the most out-
standing similarity is that Spaniards dealt with Pampangos, Cagayanos and
Tagalogs as member of different nations and accepted them with their own
military units as allies, accordingly in America natives appear also to be
considered —especially in the early stage of the conquest— as different
people among themselves. And the most interesting thing is that, even if
sometimes they were treated only as auxiliary troops under the direct com-
mand of the Spaniards, in both places most of the time they formed they
own units. We have explained that clearly in the case of the Pampangos and
Cagayanos in the Taiwan case, and Restall tells us the same for the Mayas
when he says:
«Nor was there a sense of Maya ethnic solidarity in the sixteenth century. In time,
Mayas from the Calkini region and other parts of Yucatan would accompany
Spaniards into unconquered regions as the peninsula as porters, warriors, and auxil-
iaries of various kinds. Companies of archers were under permanent commission in
the Maya towns of Tekax and Oxkutzcab, regularly called upon to man or assist in
raids into the unconquered south of the colony of Yucatan. As late as 1690s Mayas
from over a dozen Yucatec towns—organized in companies under their own officers—
fought other Mayas in support of Spanish Conquest endeavours in the Petén region».40
As for the differences in both cases one can be especially mentioned,
that in the Philippines there is more uniformity in the way Spaniards trea -
ted the native warriors, maybe because the Pampangos was the sole nation
especially involved. If we take the division in four groups of «Indian con-
querors» in Mesoamerica made by Susan Schroeder,41 we can see how she
38 In Pampanga there was a first revolt in 1585. The rebels tried to massacre the encomenderos,
because they have committed abuses. But the plot was betrayed by a native woman, wife of a Spanish
soldier. The second happened in 1645, also connected with the collection of tributes, and another in
1660. See Ancheta, 1972, 165-179.
39 In Cagayan and Ilocos Norte the first revolts related with the payment of tributes were in
1589. Later, due to the cruelty of the major Marcos Zapata, some rebellions happened in 1625-27 and
in 1639. In Ilocos Norte, there was another rebellion in 1788 motivated by the dissatisfaction over the
wine and tobacco monopolies. Ancheta, 1972, 168.
40 Restall, 2003, 50.
41 Schroeder, 2007, 15.
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mentions first those who were forced, often in chains, to accompany
Spaniards to the battle; second those who volunteered to assist a conqueror
or viceroy and then returned home, third are the groups who departed as
warriors, conquerors, and auxiliaries and became permanent colonists; and
finally the groups who eschewed warfare but went to colonize and by their
good example lure native in unsettled areas to follow their ways. In the case
of the Philippines the cases of Pampangos and Cagayanos refer mainly to
the second group, though eventually some people were forced like in the
first model (sometimes the Cagayanos on their way to Taiwan), but on the
contrary the third and four models are probably inexistent in the
Philippines.
Finally, we hope that a better knowledge of early native enrolment in
America will complement what the classical outstanding studies have
offered to us focusing mainly on Spanish soldiers. In the same way these
studies42 will also be enriched by observing other actions (like native
recruitment) of the same colonial army in a totally different setting, like
the East.
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